Florida International University College of Law

eCollections
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2018

Léon Duguit and the Social Function of Property in Argentina
M. C. Mirow
Florida International University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Mirow M.C., Léon Duguit and the Social Function of Property in Argentina, in Léon Duguit and the Social
Obligation Norm of Property, (Babie P., Viven-Wilksch J. eds., Springer, Singapore 2019). https://doi.org/
10.1007/978-981-13-7189-9_11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at eCollections. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCollections. For more information,
please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu.

[Forthcoming in Paul Babie and Jessica Viven-Wilksch, eds., Léon Duguit and the Social
Obligation Norm of Property: A Translation and Global Exploration, Cham: Springer]

Léon Duguit and the Social Function of Property in Argentina
M.C. Mirow

French jurist and law professor Léon Duguit enunciated the definitive form of the
doctrine of the social function of property in Buenos Aires in 1911. Duguit’s lectures in
Argentina marked an important stage in concretizing this new paradigm of property into legal
theory and positive law (Mirow 2016a). Despite this early enunciation of the concept of the
social function of property in Argentina’s academic community, the incorporation of this idea
into the law of the country was circuitous and transitory. Apart from Duguit’s lectures in Buenos
Aires, the only other significant Argentine work adopting and expounding the social function of
property was the Peronist Constitution of 1949. This chapter explores the way Duguit’s thought
fit into the construction of an autochthonous Argentine doctrine of the social function of property
from the doctrine’s first iteration in 1911 until the repeal of the Peronist constitution in 1956.
Scholarship on the social function in Argentina has been understandably limited because until
recently it has been difficult to extricate the historical study of property as a social function from
this constitution and its political movement and moment (Ramella, 299). The seeds of the social
function property were planted early in Argentina, but their yield was somewhat late for the
region and not as lasting as in other countries.
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the most important Argentine precursors to
Duguit’s lectures and his theory of property. This first part establishes the existence and use of
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the classical liberal paradigm of an absolute right to property in the later nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries in Argentina. This liberal construction of property was widespread
throughout Europe and Latin America; it was the very notion against which Duguit reacted. The
next part of this chapter analyses the manifestation of the social function of property adopted in
the Argentine Constitution of 1949. The works of Arturo Enrique Sampay (1911-1987), other
deputies to the constituent convention, and scholars are examined to understand their
appropriation of this doctrine of property in light of Duguit’s work. The final part assesses the
work of Duguit in the Argentine context. It notes that Duguit’s writings formed part of a broader
understanding of the social function of property that was informed by various scholars and
sources, and particularly by works on Christian humanism and the social doctrine of the Roman
Catholic church as enunciated in papal encyclicals. Because this study focuses on national
trends and materials, significant work remains to be done on the level of provincial constitutions
and other sources. These concluding comments also observe that the path of Argentina to the
social function of property in 1949 is an example of the diversity of legal development in Latin
America. Although variations of the social function of property were found throughout the
region in the twentieth century, the history of its adoption is unique in each country’s legal and
political moment.

I. Precursors

Before assessing the place of the social function of property in the Constitution of 1949, a
few observations on the previous constitution, the Argentine Constitution of 1853/1860, are
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necessary.1 The Constitution of 1853/1860 was crafted from the work of one of Argentina’s
great jurists, Juan Bautista Alberdi (Mirow 2015, 159-163; Mirow 2016b). In Bases y puntos de
partida para la organización política de la República Argentina, the most important book on
comparative Latin American constitutions of its time, Alberdi advocated a new Argentine
constitution that would promote economic growth, foreign investment, and increased population
through immigration. Alberdi criticized both the Spanish colonial law (derecho indiano) and the
constitutions of early Latin American independent republics for neglecting these essential
aspects of political and social progress (Mirow 2015, 160-161). Alberdi and the resulting
constitution he championed adopted classical liberal principles and subjective rights, including
the right to property, a non-interventionist state, and foreign investment. His stance on property
was not surprising; an unlimited and absolute right to property was by far the predominant
conception of property available to any drafter of the period (Levaggi, 123-127, 130).
Adopting this classical liberal concept of property, the Constitution of 1853/1860,
Article 17 states:
Property is inviolable, and no one living in the Confederation may
be deprived of it, unless by virtue of a judgment based on law.
Expropriation for public use should be determined by law and prior
indemnification. . . .
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The Constitution bears two years because it was first adopted by the Argentine Confederation
excluding Buenos Aires. When Buenos Aires adopted the constitution, it became the
constitution of the entire Argentine republic.
3

Thus, property had to be inviolable, and the owner of property had to have the fullest range of
rights to use and to dispose of it (Koenig, 103-104). Here, Argentine constitutional law clearly
echoed the French Civil Code of 1804 (the Code Napoléon) which stated in Article 544:
Property is the right to enjoy and to dispose of things in the most
absolute manner, provided that one does not undertake a usage
prohibited by law (Mirow translation).
Similarly, a few decades later, the Argentine Civil Code of 1871, in Article 2513, was consistent
in its enunciation of an absolute unfettered right to property:
Inherent in property is the right to possess the thing, to dispose or
to benefit from it, to use it, or to enjoy it according to the will of
the owner. He may exploit it, degrade it, or destroy it (Pasquale,
102, Mirow translation).
It was precisely this Napoleonic formulation of property, as expressed in the French Civil Code
of 1804 (the Code Napoléon), the Argentine Civil Code, and Argentina’s constitution, that
prompted Duguit’s famous response in his lectures in Buenos Aires. Working against the
backdrop of the rise of French and more generally European sociology and sociological
approaches to law, Duguit explained the social function of property through a course of lectures
spanning two months in 1911 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The lectures addressed how civil law
had changed since the French Civil Code. He addressed an admiring academic audience that was
imbued with European culture, ideas, and sources. Duguit’s polite flattery that Argentina and
France were now equally civilized must have warmed his audience. Duguit subsequently

4

published as Les transformations général du droit depuis le Code Napoléon, the work that most
fully set out his theory of the social function of property (Mirow 2010, 198-199, 207).
In bold contrast to the accepted characterizations of property established in works of
classical liberalism, civil codes, and constitutions, Duguit objected, “But property is not a right;
it is a social function” (Duguit, 21). With this assertion, he launched into uncharted waters and
carefully navigated between established notions of an absolute right to property and socialist
theories that sought to abolish all forms of private ownership. This statement reflected
theoretical and methodological trends of the time towards the “social”.
His sixth and final lecture of the series was the most unsettling and enduring. There he
explained that “I have developed the idea that capitalist property, and particularly real property,
is increasingly less of a subjective individual right and more of a social function” and he repeated
and rephrased the idea this way “Property is no longer the subjective right of the owner; it is the
social function of the possessor of wealth” (Duguit 1920, iv, v). This lecture and its subsequent
publication became the seminal source for the doctrine of the social function of property (Mirow
2010, 199-200).
Duguit’s theory purported to be descriptive rather than normative. He noted that he was
following the most modern methods of empirical and sociological investigation. These
approaches led Duguit to reject a deductive science of autonomous law, and thus to join a small
school of French anti-formalists. This positivist and realist method was informed by the works of
Émile Durkheim, Auguste Comte, and Charles Gide. The writings of lesser-known
contemporary French theorists of property also served in Duguit’s construction of the social
function of property. Raymond Saleilles, a friend and colleague of Duguit’s, wrote that rights,
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even rights in property, were not absolute. Furthermore, his work bridged sociological
approaches to law and the nascent development of Catholic social thought of the period. The
recent works of Adolphe Landry, Maurice Hauriou, Joseph Charmont, and, above all, Henri
Hayem served as the foundation for Duguit’s social function of property (Mirow 2010, 200-202,
213-220, 225). In fact, the structure and arguments of Duguit’s lecture in 1911 establishing the
social function of property follow Hayem’s doctoral dissertation at the University of Dijon in
1910 (Hayem; Mirow 2010, 216-219).
Duguit introduced the social function of property to Argentina in 1911 but it must have
entered into a landscape of concepts and ideas about property extant in the country before then.
With this in mind, Abelardo Levaggi has explored the extant academic literature for precursors
to the social function of property in Argentina. Only two works specifically adopted socialist
formulations of property, a formulation that was, of course, much further to the left of Duguit’s
social function of property. Luis A. Peyret’s doctoral dissertation at the University of Buenos
Aires in 1884 advocated the abolition of private ownership in land. In 1911, the same year
Duguit delivered his lectures, another visiting Frenchman, socialist leader Jean Jaurès argued for
placing limits on private property in a lecture on civilization and socialism. Shortly after
Duguit’s lectures, Enrique del Valle Iberlucea propounded a fully socialist conception of
property in 1915 in his article “Socialism and the Evolution of Property” (Levaggi, 127-129).
In contrast, the works affirming or tacitly accepting a classical liberal absolute right to
property set the tone during the period. This was the case, even though deputies at the
constituent convention and scholars expounding on property immediately preceding the
Constitution of 1949 attempted to justify the social function of property through historical
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antecedents in Argentina. In the 1910s, socialist ideas of property were relegated to few and
academic works outside the main stream of law students, professors, and jurists (Levaggi, 129131). In this atmosphere, it is not surprising that Duguit’s complex formulation of the social
function of property was unable to make its way into the legal matrix of Argentina when it was
expounded in 1911. Although Duguit’s theory of property was delivered in Argentina and
adopted elsewhere in Latin America shortly after its presentation, his theory remained dormant in
Argentina for decades (Mirow 2011).

II. The Argentine Constitution of 1949

After consolidating power in 1945 and 1946, the Peronist government sought to reshape
the national economy and to jettison the classical liberalism of the Constitution of 1853/1860
(Koenig, 85). In a new democratic structure, the state and property would serve the community
and human dignity (Koenig, 89). By this time, there were many national models to follow, and
many incorporated the social function of property. Constitutions from Weimar Germany (1919),
Colombia (1945), Guatemala (1946), Ecuador (1946), Peru (1947), Bolivia (1947), and Italy
(1947), amongst others, offered language explicitly adopting a social function of property or
nationalized property. These texts were compiled by José Figuerola and were available to the
constituent convention for its use in drafting the constitution (Ramella, 318-320). Although a
clear example of the direct appropriation of Duguit’s social function of property may be found in
the Chilean Constitution of 1925, this source was inexplicably referred to only infrequently by
Argentine scholars when considering the same formulation for Argentina in 1949 (Mirow 2011).
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Political enmity across the Andes may have accounted for avoiding the recent work of a
neighbour, particularly when such changes were associated with economic and social progress.
In addition to the powerful theoretical exposition of the social function of property by
Duguit in Argentina, contemporary drafters and scholars found glimmers of the application of
the social function during the pre-Peronist period, but these were weak and short-lived. For
example, Argentine codifier Vélez Sarsfield, commenting on an article on property in his Civil
Code stated that the general or collective interest could sometimes be superior to the individual
interest. There were also some decisions from the 1920s to the 1940s by the Argentine Supreme
Court in which the idea of the social function of property was employed to remedy specific
injustices (Ramella, 310, 314, 333, 338-341). In 1922, the Argentine Supreme Court of Justice
approved a law that permitted Congress to regulate urban leases, a clear step away from liberal
principles of property (Diario, vol. 1, 323; Botano and Gallo, xxiv). And in the 1940s, there were
several legislative proposals and acts for agrarian and land reform (Ramella, 342-346).
Additionally, proponents of the social function of property unsuccessfully urged this
characterization of property during drafting sessions for a new civil code from 1926 until 1936.
The draft code ultimately rejected the formulation; it was never enacted, and the existing code
continued to enunciate the classical liberal paradigm of property (Parise, 233-235). These small
and detached instances of the social function of property in Argentina between Duguit’s lectures
and the Constitution of 1949 provided little to pave the way for the language that was to be
incorporated into the Constitution. These scattered instances of changes in the nature of property
in Argentina must be understood in light of Levaggi’s assessment that Argentina had few
intellectual or legal precursors to the social function of property.
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The Constitution of 1949 was a product of Juan Perón’s election as president in 1946.
Reforming society and promoting industrialization, Perón was supported by urban workers and
their unions. Perón sought policies to favor all aspects of labor, to effect “social justice”, and to
aid the poor. He hoped to reassert national sovereignty against foreign encroachments into the
country’s political and economic life with particular attention paid to sectors controlled by
foreign firms such as railroads, power plants, and other public services. (Rock, 214, 260-263).
Peronism went deeper than fiscal policy and workers’ benefits. As David Rock noted:
Peronism, its constituents claimed, also made a major contribution
to the nation’s “spiritual” development. In a world divided by the
Iron Curtain, the doctrines of justicialismo offered an alternative to
both capitalism and communism. To its adherents justicialismo
was a social-Christian philosophy rooted in Catholic and
Aristotelian precepts of justice and harmony (Rock, 264).
Thus, Peronism called for a radical restructuring of Argentine politics, economy, society, and
even the relationship between faith and public action. The preamble of the Constitution of 1949
incorporated these themes by declaring a “Nation socially just, economically free, and politically
sovereign” (Rock, 289).
In the process of drafting a new constitution with the political and economic goals of
Peronism, Colonel Domingo Mercante, Governor of the province of Buenos Aires and president
of the constituent convention, steered the political side of constitution-making (Koenig, 93).
Arturo Enrique Sampay adeptly led the legal side of drafting the constitution with a cadre of
jurists of varying political allegiances, none of with whom Sampay perfectly aligned. He did,
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however, share with the group a strong sense of nationalism and a Catholicism that had already
schooled them in many of the foundational writings of the church’s social teaching (Koenig, 95).
In this way, Sampay’s views of constitutionalism and economy were in accord with the cultural
and spiritual revolution of Perón’s Christian humanism of the 1940s and the social doctrine of
the Roman Catholic Church (Madaria, 525, 555-565). Christian humanism and neo-Thomism
were part of the national spirit, and Sampay shared in these movements (Arias Pelerano, 16-17).
The constitution reflected the Church’s social doctrine not only in the area of property but also in
addressing areas of “special rights” related to work, strikes, family, old age, and education
(Madaria, 560-562). Sampay, describing later the overall nature of the constitution, wrote:
In summary, the so-called “Constitution of 1949” proposed to
make an effective government from the popular sectors, to free the
country from imperialism, placing financial resources, natural
resources, and the principal goods of production in the control of
the state with the goal of organizing them through planning to
achieve an independent and harmonious development of the
economy that produces modern well-being to all and to each of the
members of the community. It attempted, in this way, to establish
in Argentina the social revolution needed in the modern world
(Sampay 1973, 121-122).
Peronist drafters did not turn immediately to the social function of property for the
Argentine Constitution of 1949. In fact, the first formulation of property in the draft crafted by
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José Figuerola directly reacted to the text of the prior constitution by negating its fundamental
ideas of absolute rights. The draft stated:
Property is neither inviolable nor even untouchable, but simply
respected when it is useful not only to the individual but also to the
collective (Koenig, 126).
Sampay and the constituent convention substantially modified this language to introduce the
social function of property. Indeed, the social function of property became the theoretical and
ideological core of an entire Chapter of the Preamble of the Constitution entitled “The Social
Function of Property, Capital, and Economic Activity” (Argentine Constitution of 1949,
Preamble, Chapter IV, translated in the Appendix). This Chapter has been viewed not only as a
constitutional focal point for Argentina in 1949 but also as the core of Peronist political ideology
(Koenig, 32). These aspects were singled out by Sampay as essential features of a constitution
that eschewed both the brutalities of unbridled modern capitalism and statist totalitarian (Sampay
1963, 115-116, 121).
Central to Peronist constitutionalism, legality, and politics, Chapter IV contains three
articles addressing the social function of property, capital, natural resources, and public services.
The core of the Constitution’s definition of property is found in Article 38 of the Constitution.
An earlier draft stated that the:
Nation shall guarantee private property as a social function and, as
a consequence, the same shall be subject to the contributions,
restrictions, and obligations established by law for general utility
(Ramella, 302 n8; Mirow’s emphasis).
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This text was later changed to the language that would eventually be found in Article 38:
Private property has a social function and, as a consequence, shall
be subject to obligations established by law for the common good
(Mirow’s emphasis).
This text reveals a minor but extremely important change from the earlier draft submitted by the
Peronist Party which equated property with a social function; property now had a social function.
Ramella correctly observed that this change from “as” to “has,” importantly shifted property
from Duguit’s concept of not being a subjective right in itself (using “as”) to a juridical object
that was limited by certain obligations (using “has”) (Ramella, 302).
Without naming Duguit, his concept of property was apparently at the forefront of the
formulation of the central article on property in the Constitution of 1949. This change made the
restrictions on property in the Constitution of 1949 consistent with the general protection of the
right to property found in the constitution in Article 26 that all the inhabitants of the nation
enjoyed the right, amongst others, “to use and to dispose of their property” (Constitución de la
Nación Argentina 1949, Art. 26). Further provisions in the constitution were modifications of
this right rather than redefining the very substance of property itself. In his exposition of this
provision, Sampay specifically remarked that his concept of property had a double function,
individual and social, which worked together (Ramella, 305-307).
Articles following the adoption of the social function of property reveal that the
formulation had clear instrumental aims. This definition of property in the Argentine
Constitution of 1949 was not an aspirational statement or broadly based rejection of the absolute
right to property without practical consequences. Instead, property’s social function had an
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immediate and contemplated effect on the legal order of ownership and the political structure of
the country. As elsewhere in the region, the social function of property was often employed as a
necessary step towards or justification for land or agrarian reform (Ankersen and Ruppert, 88107; Mirow 2004, 219-227). The social function of property led in subsequent provisions to land
reform, the control of capital, and the nationalization of natural resources and public services.
The principle of the social function of property was translated and interpreted by other
articles within Chapter IV. The language provided for the expropriation of foreign capital and
the nationalization of various sectors of the economy that had heretofore been in private, often
foreign, hands. This was an about-face from Alberdi’s constitutional vision and Argentina’s
political policy of encouraging and protecting foreign investment and capital (Koenig, 129-137).
In the context of Peronism, the social function of property implicated state control of
some aspects of the economy, importantly the provision of public services often provided by
foreign companies. The initial draft of the article dealing with state control, Article 40 within the
draft of constitutional reform, was the work of José Figuerola from the President’s Secretariat,
but the final drafting was assigned to Sampay who incorporated the nationalization of public
services. When the draft article was published, Perón was besieged by demands from American,
British, Italian, and Swiss diplomats to soften the expropriatory aspect of the article. As
principal drafters of the constitution, Sampay and Mercante held their ground, and the provisions
for nationalization stood (Koenig, 112-113). Telephone service, transportation, gas, ports, and
railroads – held mostly by foreign interests – were nationalized (Koenig, 163). Sampay’s
unwillingness to yield to external political presures and to soften the application of Article 40 as
requested by Perón created a rift between the drafter and the president, and it appears that
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relations between the two were never as cordial as before. From 1952 to 1973, they did not see
each other (Madaria, 547-548, 552-553).
Even with the modification from “as” to “has”, the formulation of Article 38 closely
followed Duguit’s construction of the doctrine. Nonetheless, despite Duguit’s historic
connection to Argentina, his work was only a minor source that shaped the Peronist ideas of the
social function of property.
Well versed in constitutional theory, Sampay did not directly draw on Duguit (Sampay
1973, 6-70). Sampay’s legal education placed him within the orbit of neo-Thomist Christian
humanism. In addition to initial studies in Uruguay, he completed his legal training at the law
and social sciences faculty of the National University of La Plata (Argentina) where he obtained
his doctorate (Arias Pelerano, 10). Sampay then studied various aspects of law in Zurich, Milan,
and Paris. Particularly important for our purposes was his attendance at lectures in Paris by
Louis Le Fur on natural law and by Jacques Maritain (Madaria, 542-543) perhaps the era’s most
important proponent of the neo-Thomism, one of the underpinnings of Rerum Novarum (1891)
and the social function of property (Mirow 2016a). Sampay later noted the Thomist doctrine of
the social function of property in the Irish Constitutions of 1937 and 1940 (Buela). Thus,
Catholic social teaching and neo-Thomism were at the heart of Sampay’s understanding of the
social function of property. His traditional Thomist approach to law clashed with those who
moved Peronism to the left, and it appears his contributions were discounted by Peronists and
later spurned by post-Peronist who returned Argentina to classical liberalism (Koenig, 30-31).
Just as the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891) and Duguit’s concept of the social
function of property sought to establish a third way, a golden mean, between compassionless
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absolute rights in property under the principles of classical liberalism on one hand and communal
and state ownership of all property on the other, Sampay, following tenants of Christian
humanism, sought a construction of property that would further the common good and just order
(Koenig, 104). Indeed, it appears that Christian humanism served as a bridge between Sampay’s
construction of the social function of property and Duguit’s original formulation.
Although the Argentine Constitution of 1949 adopted the social function of property, it
must be noted at the outset that in the entire body of reported sessions of the constituent
convention, Duguit is only mentioned once by name in relation to the social function of property
(Sampay, 2012, vol. 3, p. 22; Diario, vol. 1, 315). This paucity of references to the founder of
the social function of property, a founder who had significant ties to Argentina, Buenos Aires,
and legal education in the country, is striking.

A. Interventions on the social function of property in the constituent convention

Legal historians are fortunate to have complete records of the sessions of the constituent
convention related to the social function of property. This source shows a confluence of ideas
concerning property and the constitution leading to the adoption of the social function doctrine.
Within the constituent convention, four leading members advocated for the social function of
property: Arturo Sampay; Rodolfo Valenzuela, a justice of the Supreme Court; Oscar Martini, a
Socialist university professor; and Jorge Simini, a deputy from the province of Buenos Aires
(Koenig, 116).

15

Sampay’s interventions to the constituent convention reveal his justifications for
introducing the social function of property into the constitution. Private property could not be
abolished because it had important ties to human personhood and individual liberty. Private
property, however, was also tied to community and social life (Diario, vol. 1, 277-278). From
these dual aspects of private property, Sampay concluded:
It follows, then, that private property – despite maintaining its
individual character – assumes a double function, individual and
social. . . . The proprietor – the concept is from Saint Thomas
Aquinas – has the power of administration and just distribution of
the benefits that the exterior goods possessed produce – potestas
procurandi et dispersandi – with which property fills its double
commitment. It meets an individual end covering the needs of the
possessor, and a social end by shifting the rest to the community.
The constitutional reform should be dedicated to this; together with
the individual function of property, the obligatory nature of the
social function that goes with it -- now legally sanctioned in the
country through the law of agrarian transformation – and that
makes this institution the indispensable piece of the new Argentine
economic order (Diario, vol. 1, 278).
In Sampay’s thought, Thomas Aquinas provided the theoretical basis for the social function of
property which, in turn, could be put into practice through redistributive projects, such as
agrarian reform, for the benefit of society.
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Valenzuela argued along the same lines, but elaborated on these themes and cited Duguit
in his intervention (Koenig, 117). Valenzuela asserted that individual liberties, such as the right
to property, were not ends unto themselves, but rather were to serve the well-being and
development of the collective. Such liberties had a social function (Ramella, 309).
Valenzuela’s broad themes are the transformation of the state and the limitations social
rights impose on individual rights. In this context, Valenzuela referenced Duguit to assert that
states have transformed; “the state loses its Napoleonic form to adopt a wider, more flexible,
more protective and more human form” (Diario, vol. 1, 315). Valenzuela illustrated this
principle with various twentieth-century social constitutions, mentioning Mexico, the Weimar
Republic, Estonia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Danzig, Brazil, and France (Diario, vol. 1, 315). Turning
to the topic of private property, Valenzuela opined that Argentina must find a middle path
between Soviet communism and classical liberalism; he suggested eschewing theories and
schools of thought to reach a form of private property appropriate for Argentina (Diario, vol. 1,
322).
Seeking to justify the social function of property with historical practices, Valenzuela
searched deeply for hints of the social function of property in texts that were uniformly
associated only with the absolute right to property under classical liberalism. For example, he
found that Napoléon had commented on the famous Article 544 of the French Civil Code of
1804 that the abuse of property should be avoided when it was prejudicial to society (Diario, vol.
1, 323; Ramella, 310). This slight nod in the direction of the public good appears to have been
immediately forgotten; indeed Napoléon’s French Civil Code of 1804 and its characterizaton of
property were the ideas against which Duguit reacted to construct his theory of the social
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function (Duguit, Mirow 2011, 1190). Valenzuela also carefully drew out language from
comments by the Argentine codifier Vélez Sarsfield that appeared to soften a hardline approach
to property as an absolute right. He noted that Vélez Sarsfield also recognized that absolute
dominion was subject to “the limits and under the conditions established by law” (Diario, vol. 1,
323; Ramella, 310). This was wishful thinking in light of Vélez Sarsfeld’s rather clear adoption
of an absolute right to property, again the very intellectual construction of property that Duguit
reacted against to put forth his doctrine of the social function. Nonetheless, Valenzuela’s
argument demonstrated the lengths proponents of the social function would go to rally historical
sources to justify their position.
With his thought on private property informed by foreign constitutions, competing
political theories, and recent examples of social limitations imposed on absolute ownership,
Valenzuela stated:
The solution to this important question is found in the
characterization of the right to property as a social function. This
is supported by current commentary, the observation of social
phenomena in the last century, an appreciation of the present
Argentine phenomenon, and the example of European and
American countries that, before us, were pressed to adjust their
constitutions to the necessities of the times (Diario, vol. 1, 323324).
Valenzuela discussed several of these constitutional models with particular attention paid to the
Mexican Constitution of 1917 and the Polish Constitution of 1921. He mentioned other
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constitutions as examples: Peru (1938), Bolivia (1938), Cuba (1940), Ecuador (1946), Guatemala
(1945), Chile (1925), Colombia (1936), Brazil (1946), Venezuela (1947), Dominican Republic
(1947), and Nicaragua (1947) (Diario, vol. 1, 324). Supporting the social function of property in
the Argentine Constitution, Valenzuela concluded:
By proposing in Article 38 of our Constitution that it expressly
state that private property has a social function, we intend to
resolve juridically the economic disorder that the individualist
concept of property has imposed on the social nucleus, we
establish the true content of this right and in passing assign the
principle of relativity to all other rights (Diario, vol. 1, 325)
This new concept of property led to concrete changes, such as state ownership of natural
resources and state control of public services (Diario, vol. 1, 325-326).
Martini’s views of property were also shaped by Saint Thomas Aquinas and Christian
humanism, and, in this way, sought a balancing point between communism and capitalism in the
social function of property (Koenig, 117). Martini spoke at length about the history and theory
of property and was particularly influenced by Emmanuel Mounier’s De la propriété capitaliste
à la propriété humaine (Diario, vol. 1, 514-515; Ramella, 312). Mounier was a neo-Thomist
Catholic convert and philosopher. The book, published in a series edited by Jacques Maritain,
was a primer on Thomist property law reflecting Christian humanism and Catholic social
doctrine. It is riddled with citations to Aquinas and peppered with references to the encyclicals
of the church’s social doctrine. It does not mention Duguit (Mounier).
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In addition to Mounier, Martini drew from several other neo-Thomist writers including
works by the Belgian Christian trade unionist Georges C. Rutten (1875-1952) and Louis
Garriguet (1859-1927) (Lane, 828). Quoting a Spanish translation of Rutten’s La doctrine
sociale de l’Eglise, Martini asserted:
According to the express doctrine of Saint Thomas, property of
these goods is not an absolute and unconditional right, but a power
of administration and distribution, marked with a kind of social
obligation that directs the owner to use his property for the good of
the collective (Diario, vol. 1, 515).
Through Thomism, Martini recognized the private and social function of property in the
Constitution of 1949 (Diario, vol. 1, 515). Martini similarly employed Garriguet’s La propriété
privée to distinguish the social function of property from collective ownership and to set out the
Thomist theory of the origin of property itself (Diario, vol. 1, 515-516). Like other proponents
of the social function of property, Martini as deputy invoked Aquinas and Christian humanism to
establish property’s role in the physical and spiritual well-being of the community (Ramella,
312).
Jorge Simini’s intervention operated on a more practical plane. He focused on the
redistribution of lands and the transfer of ownership to agricultural workers of the land. His
approach was more political than theoretical or legal. (Ramella, 314-315). Thus, deputies
brought different levels of commitment to and comprehension of the social function of property
to the constituent convention.
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Unlike Simini’s arguments, most of the interventions of these deputies revealed a focus
Christian humanism as a component of a European legal thought. All proponents of the social
function of property were versed in the social teaching of the Catholic church as an outgrowth of
Christian humanism and neo-Thomist thought on society, economy, work, and property as found
in the encyclicals Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quadragesimo Anno (1931). This perspective on
property was particularly important to Sampay and served as common ground in their approach
to the topic (Madaria, 555-560). These underpinnings of the social function of property appeared
to be much more influential than the tradition based on secular European sociological treatises
that included Duguit and his works. This later tradition, however, was not completely absent.

B. Argentine legal culture and academic commentary

These drafters of the Constitution of 1949 shared a common heritage of Argentina’s
unique legal culture. The first half of the twentieth century was a particular rich and engaging
moment for students, teachers, and practitioners of law. Sharing in a broader trend of the
cultivation of knowledge, Argentine universities and their law faculties became centers for the
serious academic investigation of their discipline. For example, the library at the faculty of law
at the University of Buenos Aires was a significant research collection of approximately 12000
volumes replete with European and American sources (Tau Anzoátegui, 13-14). Students,
professors, and lawyers were steeped not only in Argentine legal knowledge but also in materials
and thought from throughout Europe. As Tau Anzoátegui summarizes:
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Argentina, a country of immigrants, was open to the reception of
European juridical literature – French, Italian, Germany, Spanish –
and in particular, Anglo-American works in some areas of law.
The names of author-jurists such as Savigny, Ihering, Stammler
and Kelsen; Gény, Saleilles, Planiol and Duguit; Ferri, Del
Vecchio and Chiovenda; Altamira, Posada, Jiménez de Asúa,
amongst others, were well known in the classrooms and in works
written in the country, without neglecting the older classics of
philosophy, politics, and jurisprudence (Tau Anzoátegui, 15;
Mirow’s emphasis).
Classroom lectures, books and their citations were supplemented with international
correspondence, networks of scholars, and travel. The period from 1901 to 1945 also witnessed
the adoption of broader sociological approaches to law, pushing lawyers away from a textual,
code-centered analysis to questions of societal impact and later back again to doctrinal
approaches (Tau Anzoátegui, 15-35). Despite such fluctuations over these decades, the drafters
of the Constitution of 1949 would have been exposed to and adopted or critiqued such authors
and their ideas, Duguit and his works among them. Thus, scant citation to Duguit’s work and
thought does not exclude familiarity with them and their influence on the provisions of the
Constitution of 1949 addressing property.
Sources of the social function of property in the Argentine Constitution of 1949 are not
limited to the debates by the deputies in the constituent convention. Ramella has uncovered and
described an additional significant source for legal historians of the social function of property, a
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set of questions to and responses from the law faculty of the University of Buenos Aires
conducted in 1948 in light of the new constitution (Ramella, 324; Facultad de Derecho). Several
professors raised the social function of property and the importance of placing this definition of
property in the new constitution. These included Miguel Ángel Berçaitz, Máximo Gómez
Forgues, Carlos Mouchet and Alfredo R. Zuanich who approved the incorporation of the social
function of property as found in the draft constitution (Ramella, 327-328). Other professors
explored the topic at greater length.
Recognizing the difference between Duguit’s concept of “property as a social function”
and the less transformative idea of “property having a social function,” Professor of civil law
Fernando Legón suggested that the second formulation would strike the appropriate balance
between the individual and the collective (Ramella, 328). Without such direct references to
Duguit, several other professors -- Héctor Llambías, Juan Villoldo, Bargallo Cirio, and Moyano
Llerena -- noted the importance of the common good, service, and human life in relationship to
property (Ramella, 328).
In addition to the answers to this questionnaire, Salvador Dana Montaño, the director of
the same institute, offered his thoughts on property in a contribution to a conference on
philosophy originally scheduled for 1948 but held a year later. Published as Justicia social y
reforma constitucional, the book treated the question of property extensively in seven chapters.
There is not one mention of Duguit, but Dana Montaño makes a rare reference to the Chilean
Constitution of 1925 whose property provisions were based directly on Duguit’s work (Dana
Montaño, 117, Mirow 2011). His conclusions were in keeping with the ideas expressed above
and specifically adopted the viewpoint of Christian humanism over European theorists to place
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restrictions on the unbridled exercise of property (Dana Montaño; Ramella, 329-330). Although
employing distinct terminology, these professors all sought to modify the idea of an absolute
right to private property by tempering it with some sense of social obligations to the common
good, the collective, and the human being (Ramella, 328).
Deputies and professors supported Sampay’s adoption of the social function of property.
Further support may have been found in Sampay’s vision of constitutional goals. Apparently
influenced by the political writings of Ferdinand Lassalle, Sampay sought constitutions that
reflected reality as much as possible rather than those that expounded an ideal structure or goals
detached from actual constitutional and state practice (Arias Pelerano, 20; Sampay 1973, 37-39).
This view aligned well with Duguit’s presentation of the social function of property in which he
asserted that property as a social function was a presently accurate description of property based
on numerous illustrations gathered by Duguit from French law (Mirow 2011, 1192). Thus, in the
pursuit of real constitutionalism, Sampay, if he were directly aware of Duguit’s arguments for
the social function, would have been drawn to their present descriptive, rather than future
normative, force.
Recognizing a second practical aspect of changing the nature of property in Argentina,
Sampay also knew that this new definition of property had to be extended from constitutional
language into the everyday applicable language of the civil law, a new civil code. As Sampay
noted in this context, “with the exception of family law, the civil code is nothing more than the
ordering of property law” (Diario, vol. 1, 279). Because a civil code was built on the concept of
property, the social function of property would become the central aspect of a new civil code
(Koenig, 136-137). As Sofanor Novillo Corvalán commented after the incorporation of the
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social function of property into the Constitution of 1949, property in Argentina operated on at
least two planes, a constitutional level dealing with the state and a codified level governing the
day-to-day notions of title and ownership (Ramella, 330). Nonetheless, the projection of the
social function of property into the sources of applicable private law in Argentina was not
accomplished. This lack of penetration into the civil law meant that there were various levels
within which the interpretation of property could take place (Ramella, 352).
Even on the constitutional level, the redefinition of property had striking consequences.
Private property was not abolished; it now had a double function, one individual and another
social. The social function of property justified “anti-imperialist” projects of nationalization and
the expropriation of foreign capital within Perón’s particular interpretation of Christian
humanism (Koenig, 144-145). The debates of the drafters and particularly the work and
interventions of Arturo Enrique Sampay reveal the rhetorical strategies used to incorporate this
radically new, yet politically consistent, construction of property into the Peronist constitution.
Successful constitutional reform only occurs at particular political moments. Peronists observed
the compatibility of the social function of property with many of their constitutional and legal
reforms. They surely noted the flexibility and utility of the doctrine.
The Constitution of 1949 was not long-lived. It was abolished by military dictators and
erased from the political and legal history of Argentina (Koenig, 31-32). In 1955, anti-Peronists
ushered in a coup under Eduardo Lonardi, a national Catholic military officer (Koenig, 211). On
April 27, 1956, President Aramburu decreed that the Constitution of 1949 was derogated and that
the Constitution of 1853/1860 with subsequent amendments was in force (Koenig, 231). This
decree marked the end of the social function of property in Argentina and a return of the absolute
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protection of private property under classical liberalism and the Constitution of 1853/1860
(Ramella, 308-309; Sampay 1973, 122-124). There were some unsuccessful attempts to
introduce the social function of property during the constituent convention of 1957, especially as
it was tied to agrarian reform and the redistribution of land (Ramella, 351). The most significant
phase of the social function of property in Argentine positive law was over. The Argentine
Constitution of 1853/1860 with its substantial revisions in 1994 recognized an inviolable right to
private property unhindered by the imposition of property as or having a social function
(Constitution of 1853/1860 revised 1994, Art. 17).

III. Assessing Duguit’s Influence in Argentina

Tracing Duguit’s work and influence in Argentina provides an example of the way legal
and political ideas in seminal sources can be pulled into other sources, lose an identifiable
connection to the original source, and continue as important features of legal development
without direct attribution. For example, this challenge has been presented well in studies
assessing the contributions of the United States Declaration of Independence and the United
States Constitution of 1787 to constitutional and political thought in the world. George Athan
Billias has used the metaphor of echoes to represent the untraceable reports of legal texts and
their content as they travel the world over time, becoming reflected, absorbed, modified, and
softened on each iteration (Billias). By 1949, Duguit’s works and his theory of the social
function of property had undergone similar appropriations, modifications, and assimilations into
other works and, as Levaggi reminds us, into the mentality of cultured early twentieth-century
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Argentine jurists. It had echoed back and forth across the Atlantic Ocean, off and over the
Andes Mountains, throughout Europe and Latin America. Drafters of the Argentine Constitution
of 1949 knew Duguit’s writings and his concepts even if some of them did not mention his name.
Duguit was, however, named, not only directly in the debates related to the social function of
property in the constitution but also by scholars and writers outside this circle of drafters. We do
not find, for example, the multiple references to Duguit in the constituent convention and direct
quotations of his work by the president as in the case of the Chilean Constitution of 1925 (Mirow
2011, 1200-1205). Nonetheless, Duguit’s works must be added to a list of multiple sources and
influences that led to the adoption of the social function of property in Argentina.
The different paths that countries of Latin America took to incorporate the social function
of property into their constitutions at different times serve to caution legal historians of the
region. One must not jump to conclusions of similarity of development when observing similar
ends. The examples of Argentina, Chile, and Colombia demonstrate this well (Bonilla; Mirow
2011). Nonetheless, similar approaches to sources, texts, foreign influences in Latin America
meant that even in these three distinct cases, Duguit served in one way or another as an important
author (Bonilla, 1154-1159). Brazil, however, adopted a social function of property without
direct reference to Duguit, but the influence of Duguit’s thought on developments in the country
remains unsettled (Crawford, Cunha).
Just as Latin American countries adopted the social function of property in various ways
and at different times, they employed the term and its theory in different political contexts and
with different goals in mind. The Peronist adoption of the social function of property was
consistent with contemporaneous constructions of a Peronist state, economy, and political
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structure. Peronists interpreted “social function” in light of the political exigencies pressing on
the state, the economy, and its legal system. Not recognizing the political and legal malleability
of the term, those leading the coup of 1955 determined that such a term and its interpretation had
best be abolished rather than adapted.
This rejection of the social function of property in Argentina may be contrasted with
appropriation of the social function of property in Chile by left and right. Both Presidents
Allende and Pinochet found the term useful because each could carefully design programs,
policies, and actions around their own definition of the “social function” (Mirow 2011, 12161217). In these contexts, “social function” has no fixed meaning and suffered from
indeterminacy (Esquirol, 340-341). Indeed, in the context of the Argentine Constitution of 1949,
the scholar Carlos Enrique Mackinnon observed that an inherent danger in the social function of
property was its openness to various interpretations by leaders and politicians with opposite ideas
of government and the common good (Ramella, 330).
Diversity of legal experience exists not only in the exterior but also within the interior.
This study has focused exclusively on national developments. In a country as varied as
Argentina and with a history of strong regional distinctions and federalism, interesting work
remains to be done on the provincial level and particularly with the incorporation of the social
function of property into provincial constitutions. Indeed, Koenig noted the existence of 14
provincial constitutions that incorporated the social function doctrine, and Parise also mentioned
the doctrine in several provincial constitutions (Koenig, 43; Parise, 217). The use of provincial
sources in this national development remains unknown.
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Similarly, this study has made only passing reference to civil codes and judicial opinions.
In civil law countries, theoretical understandings of property are often transferred into positive
law in civil codes as well as in constitutions. Judges may reveal their interpretation of these
provisions through the jurisprudence of case law. While constitutional provisions are now
widely accepted as governing the subsidiary law of codes and the content of private law, this
hierarchical structure was not always clearly established. This ambiguity of hierarchy in sources
was particularly apparent in the field of property where scholars and practitioners of private law
often successfully asserted the primacy of civil code provisions and their underlying origins in
Roman law and the ius commune against novel and broad definitions of the property found in the
public law sources of constitutions. Thus, modern scholars attempting to understand the
construction of property in early twentieth-century Argentina must be aware of the tensions and
contradictions expressed by members of the legal academy and profession. This is particularly
true in the exploration of the social function of property because Duguit’s analysis purported to
be descriptive of changes in property that had already occurred in the advanced legal and
economic societies of Europe and Latin America.
Duguit’s work was a source for the Argentine construction of the social function of
property from its introduction in 1911, during the first half of the twentieth century, and until the
repeal of the Peronist constitution in 1956. Although mentioned in the debates of the Argentine
Constitution of 1949, Duguit was only one of a variety of sources employed by advocates of the
doctrine, and his direct influence in the area is significantly less than one might expect
considering the historical link between his lectures in Buenos Aires and the founding of the
doctrine. Argentine proponents of the social function of property appear to have turned more
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readily to emanations of the doctrine found in Catholic social teaching and its foundational
documents such as the papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno. Duguit’s
work was present, but it was not a singular voice in the field.
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Appendix
Chapter IV of the Preamble of the Constitution of Argentina (1949)

Chapter IV. The Social Function of Property, Capital, and Economic Activity.

Article 38. - Private property has a social function and therefore is subject to the obligations
towards a common good established by law. The State must control the distribution and use of
farmlands or intervene in order to develop and enhance their productivity in the interest of the
community, and ensure to all farmers or farmer-families the opportunity to become owners of the
land they cultivate. Expropriation for reasons of public utility or general interest must be
authorized by land and previously compensated. Only Congress imposes the taxes mentioned in
Article 4 [of this constitution]. Every author or inventor is the exclusive owner of his work,
inventory or discovery for the term provided by law. Confiscation of property is abolished
forever from Argentine legislation. No armed group can make requisitions or require assistance
of any kind during time of peace (translation from Parise, 216).

Article 39. - Capital should be for the service of the the national economy and have as its
principal object the social well-being. Its diverse forms of exploitation may not be contrary to
the ends of the public good of the Argentine people.
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Article 40 - The organization of wealth and its exploitation have for its end the well-being of the
people within an economic order conforming to the principles of social justice. The state by
means of law shall be able to intervene in the economy, monopolize certain activity in
safeguarding the general interest and within the limits established by fundamental rights
guaranteed in the Constitution. Excepting importation and exportation, which shall be governed
by the state in accordance with the limitations and procedures determined by law, all economic
activity shall be conducted in accordance with free private initiative, as long as it does not have
its ostensible or hidden goal of dominating national markets, eliminating competition or unfairly
gaining benefits.
Minerals, water courses, deposits of oil, carbon and gas and the other natural sources of
energy, with the exception of vegetables, are the unassignable and inalienable property of the
Nation with the corresponding participation in their production as shall be convenient for the
provinces.
Public services belong originally to the state and under no condition may they be
transferred or conceded for their exploitation. Those that find themselves under the power of
individuals shall be transferred to the state, through sale or expropriation with prior
indemnification when determined by national law.
The price for the expropriation of business concessions of public services shall be the
original cost of the goods as affected by the exploitation less the sums that have amortized during
the lapse completed from the grant of the concession and the excess above a reasonable profit
which shall also be considered as the recovery of investment capital.
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